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POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS IN SMALL STATES 
Abstract 
n.i.., !Jtll'cr wtal}ses the nature, intensiveness and clo~cncss of the relationship bee ween the pohuci:tn~ and 
career civi l servants with respect to the execution of their respective functions. 1 h.: paper pays pankular 
aucntbo to diOCrent perceptions of the ·~state .. and •'Government" in comparative p~r ... pcctive. and nic~ to 
estnbl"h a link between those different perceptions and the nan.re of the ci' il service system in small 
junsdiclions. The papcr also analyses the applkabolil} of Lccmans · '"methodolog.) ·· of local g.nvcmm<nt to 
smallitatc,. The paper argues that this methodology can sometimes help in undersmnding the problems of 
small <nmmunitics, but cannot be directly applied ro small states. Finally, the paper looks at ti1C tlil'fcrcnt 
exi<ung models or politico administrative relation,, and asse~sc' whether they can be applkd w small 
'tales. 
Introduction 
The pt<lblcms of ;mall srates have attracted the attention of scholars and prnctitionc" m~inly since the 
lq60' "hen the va\t majoril)' of today"' small state' gamed their indep.!ndencc from the former oolonial 
po"crs. Small jurisdiction; are not only small in territorial si1c and'or populauon. but al"' e•perience 
man) rroblcms in their economic dc>clopmem, human resources managemenL cllicienC)· and cliccll\ encs~ 
of the civil service systems. In recent years, the political vulnerability of small states emerged lt< n m~jor 
problcn1 (Commonwealth Advisory <iroup. 1997), While in the 1970s the lt>CU< of anention ""s on 
development (especially economic development) iS\ues. current!> there are man) works dealin~ with the 
Stturity problems of small states and their relathe power in international relations (Goetschcl, 1<)()8). I he 
pn>blem of economic< of scale in public administration de<;ign was al"' noticed and addressed (Ual:cr, 
1992) 
Creatirg n new public aUministrarjon system. reforming the remndnls of the colonial civil sen:ic~. and 
delinirl!! a ne" pubhc policy agenda can be an o•-en•hdming task for a na..,ent iJ1dcpcndent <tate. Whik 
the colonial civil sen-ice was e'«emally imposed tb> the fomter colonial power). the newly cre.1ted national 
civil "trvice ha..; to be the expression of domestic cont.Jitinns. societal cultures, and national e~q)~m.tjon~. 
l!nduuotedly, the locnl milieu is an irnpt>l'lant fuctor fnr public policy fomtulation and cxec~non. l he 
relationship between thf" prntf:.s.sionol c ivil service and olf.!cted politician~ i3 cruciol f\">r the UdiniHon of lhc 
politicd regime and the efficiency of the civil ;cr. ice. Although there are claims th•t some ci' il ~"icc 
S)stem. are. b} d~lini1ion. apolitical (HC 92-11). the politi<:i'><ltion of the l'ublic Admimw-ation i' 
imptN>ble to a'oid l"he is;ue is not "hethcr, but to v.hat extent. is the civil :.ervicc system depoliticiscd, 
In a l>lflall state the politicisation cnn have even wider implications. as it i~ u~utt lly accompnuicd b) 
ncpotbm (due to small population). protege <md close-knit !,'lllllp promotion practice. 'lhcr-clhrc, the 
question of depoliticisation. professionalism and the introduction of wider accountabilil) and re>p<>n,ib>lit~ 
of d1e cil if ser\'ice in >mall states "ammt in•·esti!l"tion. This paper argues that the p.!rformancc of thc ci'il 
seT\ k~ in small state;, can be impro>ed if the service i~ depoliticed 
• l>r X\' e 13 a Prim.:i-rc.l l.c:cturcr in Accuurl\i"R and ~ JDalli..'e at the Lni\·C't'iit} nf 
firc•c:n\~ 1d'l 8ui.JJ'tleS3 Sd'xd. I mdon.liK. 
'Small' Country Size and the Ch•il Service 
Ahhough the relative problem of o;ize hos been attracting ~holars since the carl) development of the theor) 
of the state. there were doubts as to whether small' deserve panicular attention (see, for in,tance Baehr. 
1'174, Chr~tmas-Mocller, 19&3). In the theor> of mtcmational relation~. the problem of small state• '"" 
connected wirh the problem of relative p<>wer, power being undcrsu)od as an ability to inlluence anuther 
:,t~tlc·s beha\•lour. or to pre'·~nt another rrom influencing one's own bcha,·iour and action'\. Usuall,.·. JXJWcr 
was CC•nnected with the size of territor). population or economic strength. 
rhe issue nf size in the theof) of public administration has often been regarded as un.imporuoool (Munay. 
1981). although small state scholars would emphru>i•c that econ<>mies of scale constraints upply to puhlic 
admin stration as well to all other ~as of social hie. Due to lheor limite<! natural fC"<>urces endo"nocnts 
'""'" >tate, tend to ha,e fev.er options thllll larger on...-s. In addition they tend to ha'e a rel•thel) small 
number of players (Rmy, 1991). In spite of this, many small states import models of the civil service fiOHI 
fonner colonial powers. downsized w fie the smaller territory. Technical downsizing othm is not fi•llowt>d 
by the nece>s~ry reorganisation or the redefinition of functional relmionshiJl'· Pure tl..:(.;hmca.l redu<.tion m 
size olthe ci•il ''"'ice b like I) to create difficultic,. affecting the quality ol the service. 
Culture and Politico-Administrative Models 
O.:spite oor usual perception of the civil service as a monolith 'tructure. it• chatacteri>tk,. <ex~ anJ 
operating principles and procedures may V8f) ,ig~tificantly from one country to anoth~r lhc nature of the 
politician-civil servant relationship may change due to changes in the dominam political idcoi<•ID of the 
time or major changes in the political leadership. Therefore. the very natur~ of intcmctions between tht 
political sector and (public) administration is inOuenced b) man~ variables v.hich range from a political-
admin~ti\C culture in a count() to 'ariou:. sector <pedtic propenics. 
II brief cro"-coulllf> comparison shows that two adverse proccssc< are at work. In somo countries. there is 
increasing political control over public administration to ensure that the burcaucrac} adupts the nt" 
pnlitic<.l sibon.1ls: \\hile in oth~rs, there appears to be" rei<Wttion of political control in onk."< In en.1blt th¢ 
public admonistration to adapt to external changes h) •inue of il\ organisationJI c;Jpaciti~s 
There is also n trend nf the increasing inllucnce of civil society on the overall Jl(llitical sy;t¢m in a tountr}. 
llndoubtedly. some macroeconomic structural changes (primaril> privatisation) that sustain the rol~ and 
intluen:e of thi! market {and vic.t" "'""") caU>ed a relaxation ,,r the politicul '!leering .tnU control ot llu .. 
public administration. Here we refer the appeamnce of the ·'New Right" (Ro•anquet. 19R:l; King, 1'187: 
Pollitt.l\1\13. etc.) both in theoretical thought and in practice (e.g. the l3arune« Thatcher year.: in th~ lA.:. 
1979-!;)<)Q, •nd Reaganomics in the liS/1). 
I lh<.· issu~ M ¥o·hat t8ctol":) ~11-oult.l h<: c ... ,ns..id-:(t.'d 11• &fine a ~tat~ :.sa small unc h:ti ~.o 
,~cd ill the litC'11Jtnn: (St."\: Cunnnclft-.U].rh ~crrl:!li~, IWi· g .. Q, Ml!l} •u&lw."'-
~on_~ldcf- a \t:ttc M btmg sm1lltt It'S" population '' lfound one m1lhcm , .. ~s 
Models of the Civil Sen·ice 
l'hcoretically the civil ~ervice 5y~iems can be classified into five group> (Peters, 1984; 1988). 1\ number of 
authots support this division making some other, usually m inor changes ( Rose. 1987). In the fif'l model the 
clear ~eparatlon between politician~;, and administration exists, 1n which the d-.-it "crvants a11! read) tn 
unque;tioningl} folio" '"" orders of the political appointee\. The secood model (call~d .. , tllag~ lite·) 
~sum:~ that civil 'crvants and politicians are both pan of a unified '"'te elite and that the) should not be in 
connict over power wtthtn the government structure itself. The third model (called •· functional 'illngc lifo .. ) 
amtmes some degree 01' integration In civil service and political car~crs. t\ politician and a civil servant 
from ~nc government department have more in common than a minister v.ith his political cabinet 
colleagues heading different governmental portfoliO\. The founb n><>dcl (named .. a .. hcN<! model .. ) assum"" 
a 5i!!Jltficant 50paration herweeo the two groups (politicians and bureaucrats), but al"' there is no clear 
rcwhmon in their struggle for power. n,e fifth model a~sumes the clear separation between policymalwrs 
and adminjstration, where, however, civil servants nrc the dominant f(,rc.e (see Wil~on, 1975)1 All thc~t,; 
ll\O~cls are rather theoretical. ;md practice by itself shows different patterns Of interaction bcl.vcon 
politictans anti civil service. ).1odels represent ru. u'ual. a stylized illustration of inter-active beha•iuur (see 
Gitldeas. 1971) . 
.. functional ''illagc life .. and .. village life" arc the most common models Jl>r the continental Furopean 
practice. However, with some policy changes in a presidential 'YStem. there appear diffcrctil ways of 
netwotl..ing beh•een politicians. public servant> anti experts working outside the government ~tructure. The 
nature of such networking is rather tempotal). and the main characteristics of the civil set\ icc ')"~m 
prc,atl. fbi~ shows that "''et)' particular civil service system i' primaril) -nattonally colour<..f .. (Se\ic. 
1997). and .. etho~-gcnerated" chamcteristics cannot be neglected or avoided. Each country deal~ "tth i~ 
m-.t national civil servic~ system and tries to utilise another country's experience'. but not neglecting its 
(mn sp~cifics demonstrated through the legal '}stem and legal order (Sevic. l<l96). politi<ltl culture. 
democ'iltic traditions (or lack of the ~me). and ethos-chara<'len'.ttcs. !be same appli~s to the r-,nicular 
pmhlem of civil service '>'item (de)politicisation. 
The relationship hctween politicians and the civi l servants is regulat~d by law. although in coutltri~> with 
long traditions of an ind~pendent civil service. informal rules play an important role. In n:ocnt }Oar<. 
political culture and attitudes have been given importance when anai)Sing the politico-admint<trative 
relatioo<hip. From sur••>• of population (citizens.\Ottrs) one can gauge the opinion ofth<: public and thetr 
attiludt'S tO\\o'Srd..; the civil service. Often in oountits of continental Luropcan tmdltions. (he gcn~1~1l public 
makc~t. a cJear distinction bcLween the Government nnd Lhc civil service. Government is pcrc.;tvcd as a 
colk<ttvc body consisting of politicians. and therefore is time lim ited. while the civil,crvice is porccivctl as 
an cmtodiment or the state it,elf. Often politicians in such S)>tems can try to u.w the ctvil service "" th<ir 
poliuc;;J purposes and <.hifi tbe respon,ibilil) focus from themselves onto the service. Social annudes 
tov;anl, the ci,il service influence recruitment policic~ and the O\crall identity of the ..crvice. 
/\n anrlysis of the policy prO«ss b important fot· an ovcmll understanding nf the relationship between 
politicbn~ and the civil servants. As we ha\o'e seen. in !SOcially responsible :,t:tling .... the civil ~tn ki! can 
have much more po\\er over the techntcal side of the polic) implementation. rhrough ··,.hi,tlehlo"er· 
po"""' it can idenufy practic._-.. -.hich are inefficient or illegal. and it is possible to expect an tntCf'<ntion 
of legt!lari>·e or judicial)· powers to correct the situation. Often. the civtl service is involved in the pmce>S 
of preparing drafts of legal acts can disclose in all their richncs. tho v;ltiety of diff~r~nt policy proeedtu·es 
ant! practices. Inter-ministry co-ordination and exerci>e of admimstrative p<mo" hy the minister in this 
prO<:e5! can disclo-;e to \\hat e'tent the government of the day is Jl<!r<:ching the ci•il '""ice as a poliq 
instrurrent. 
Ollen. ,ven in the most tlcmncratic countries. tho puhlic is regulady informed that the go,•et'llll\f.llll of the 
day has crossed the line and over pnltticised the civi l service lor the purpose~ or shorHem1 gain and dnily 
political use. 
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Fcrrelllead~ 0'196) dc•clo!l"d a mod~l wllich in many ways complement the already mentioned Peters' 
model llcad) SIUdies the relationship of the civil $Ct'\·ice "ith tilt political reg~me. finding thUt the ci'il 
>er.·tct can be ruler responsive, singl~ pany respon,i\c. majoril) pdny responsive and militlr) re;ponsivc. 
Also. the ~ocio-ecnnomic conte't intluences the relationship. The civil service can operate in t~atlitional, 
pluralist competitive, mixed, corporatist and centrally planned socio-economic cnvironmenls. Focusing on 
pcr;ornel management, he concluded that dillerent ci•il service ~y>tems can apply the following models: 
chief :•ccutive. independent agcnc). divided and minisny-by-mmimy. Determining the quaht) of the 
entran;c requiremcn~. the civil _..-ice S) 5.tcm can promote any of the following: parrimon). pan) IO) all). 
part) thtCronagc .. p1vfc))iunal pettOnnanet!. and bw·eaucr.Ulc detennanution. Being o ~ucial organisllfh)tl th~ 
civil ~rvice must huve a sense of mis~ion. Sense of mission is shared within rhl! service and can bt: 
compliance. cooperation, policy re5.pOn>ivc'l1e~. con>titutinnal responsivcnes~ and guidance. Using the 
model and taking into account all policy variables "ould enable us to determine the nature of the JXIIitico-
admin 'trarive relatlon"'ip in difTcr~nt ch il ~rvlce S)~tem~. 
\1orgnn developed another model. lie began with classilying the states into integral, patrimonml, and 
tustodial. In an integral state the civil service is supposed to behave n.~ a ~ccul<tr, ratiMnl f'(tlicy Instrument 
in the delivery of ·development' through government agencies or >tateowned entcrpri<cs (Morg.ut. IQ96: 
130). The patrimonial ~tate is in fact a leo;s effective integral state caught in the ti"•J' of a ·cJicnL<h: eiTe~t' 
(clan. ethnic. rcligiou~. territorial and other segregallon and'or favouritism). In the custodial >tate, the civil 
•crviu has heen seen as a protector of the very idea of state as n social institution. The cil•il sen· ice 
provid:s eternal stability in fairly unstable political conditions. Morgan also analy<ed tht level .. r 
institutionali,ation of n:ation-statc. assuming that the ci>il serviu can be anti-state, pro-state, in~titutional 
state a1d inchoate Mate. Anal}>ing the degree of profcs>iooalism. II<' related value of process and \dlue of 
outcomes with professionalism and J"()lilical resJ'(In>i,eness. Combining all these one gets four quadrants 
which should cover all the existing civil sen·icc systems. Accordmp, to Morgan the first quadrnm i; the 
pragmatic fie ld, the scc<>nd is the patrimonial field, while the third is the positivi~! field and 1\niilly. the 
tounh i' the absolutist field. 
Applicability of Civil Service Models to Small States 
lkcause of the historical connections with the fhrmcr colonial powers. small \Uiles imponcd mc>dcls from 
the larger territories liowever, due to specific historical de\elopments and underlying cultures after 
independence all tbe-c countries modtlied their ci,·il service sy'<tems to some e~tent (at least <"<"nleticall) ). 
In such "ales, group, clan, tribal and other similar micro-interests dominate the poltcy proco"'. The tllodel; 
discus..cd above have therefore to be •ccn in the context offhe social and cultural realities of these states. 
Some nrnullstntcs ha-.~ l'ctaincd :.t•u\:lu1cs fmm t.host txls£1ng under colonial rcgnnes nor mstancc. 'vlaJta). 
"ith a li~h degree of impartialiTy and professionalism. Size related factors however remains a problem for 
the ci' il .crvice in all 'mall srates. 
Althou~h smaller societies are u5ually very c.ohesivc t~nd co·Qperativc. il does not follow that 1I1~1'C are no 
o~ter CJnflicts. In a civil service where everyone knows everybody. it b diOieull to perform pruli.,.siunal 
duties in an unbia<ed "ay. a. every public actitm will be e.\amincd through the pri•m of group mtcrcsts. 
Belonging 10 a villagt or a clan ts imporumt for tilt 5.uccess in both politic, and a ci>ril ser. ic~ C.lll'\!r. 
lnlormal rule~ outside the civil sen ice innuence the processes wtthtn the service more in small ~tatcs than 
in lat·gcr jurisdiction>. 
A ci,il >er.ant is u.sually seen as ·our man in .. .' and therefore he.;hc i> obliged to a,,ist his'her tribe,men. 
mernlxn nfthe clan, 'tllage, etc. It ;. difficult to di>tancc oneself from the pla<:e ol origin and to ,le,elop d 
profes>ional. independent pnlic) stance. In a similar ""Y the bond between politici~n• and civil \Crvants i" 
developed, adding to all the pntblems already mentioned. 
Importation of Inappropriate Models 
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Practice has shown that ;orne small ;tates kept for a while and alrnoxl unchanged, former cult1nial public 
.tdministration. This is a very untorrunate solution. The colonial civil service was designed to k~ep public 
order lnd to cntorce Ia" in such a \18)' a> to facilitate the colonial rule C.:oloni•t civil serv oce "a~ notlhcr< 
to ser;c the local population or to proll'CI the intere~ts of a colony as such. In history there \1<-T< ca''" 
"her~ the coloni~l ch•il servants "ere more responsible than wa.\ required in prolccun~; the possible 
inlerem of the local commun ity, but this was the exception rather than the rule. 
The p1blic administration in small countries is often faced with the problem as to how it can efticicutly 
~nforce rh~ l~w on nil i1:1 tcrritoT). du~ to it~ small3izc. I hi~ i!oo tlu: )itudliun ~pt.-cially with ~ome countrh:~ 
"'nich have large territOr) in relaJioo to the si7..e of population (for in<tance 1.\om•ana). '>cJrce rewurce' 
and l<•w levels e>f de,elopmcnt can be proj<'Cted onto the ci•il "'r\lce as \\ell, a.' the country "ill 
~xpcrionce a problem as to how to linance me civil "-'l'vice and its regulnr activit ies. The problem is made 
wnr>~due to the fact that small states tend to have timoted human capital, a condition often exac.:;rhatcd a>" 
resu lt of brain -drains. 
~mall siLC and limited resources ""luire very car.:lul management and clear introduction nf strategic 
mana.,nement (c,pecially slralegtc planning).Consequently this requires an appropri.llc pcrlormane< 
mea.,u·emem S)>tcm (Sevic !lnd Rabreno,·ic, 2000). Small countries often have mer-extended pcr;nnnd. 
small ;pare or rc.crve capacity, limited number of experts (and often possessing skills that art not "' 
necc's~ry in a 'mall country context), innppropriate training, and low jub ;atisfaction II' addressed 
properly. these problems can tum into opponwtitie• for further development if adrnini<lrative refonn 
involvts the development of a pool of trained pervoMel and the d<velopmem of a local bas.! of cxpcrt' 
I his \\ill initiate further changes throul!)lout the sy~tem. hke concentric ctrcles. 
Public Administration theo1y empha.>i~es the impon.ance of a ·critical mass' concept applied to per:>onnd 
development (13akcr, 1992). According to this argument, a small country must develop the minimum r uol 
of knowledge and ~~ ilb to make th~ necessary impact on social development. Thi~ is• specific application 
ofth~ concentric circles' concept of public service reform diffusion. Ho"c•er. it is a problem a' to ho" to 
lecp trained personnel working m the countl'), esp.:ciall) when they acquire ad•anced sktlls and bcwmc 
international!) compctitive. lhis represents one side of the pmblem. 
Relationship between Civil Servants and Citizens 
Anoth'< problem is that due to Ute counn·y's small ,i,c. civil servanL' "ork "ith people that thdy more or 
les.• !.now. Often 8 client i5 8 relative. friend. or neighbour. The problem of close-J..nit nch'nrk is vel') 
difficu t to overcome. due to the limn:ations of 'mal !ness. 
In a large state, the civil service may hide behind the faceless execution <>flaws. A civil >Crvant js just part 
of the larger mechanism of law cnli>rcement. A civil servant in a small >late has in fact a p<)Sit iun s irn ilarto 
a lucal government otliciaL Everyone knows who applied the law, and the ullicial action is seen 'vith m<>rv 
human eyes. the ci'il servant action is perceived more in a per..onul than in an offtctal capacit) . 
Pcr;omlisation of an official relationship cannot be avoided in >mall states. In a large J,.,sdictk•n. 
belong ng to the civil ~ervice usually carries some \\eight. since a civil senice career, a~ • rut~. is perceived 
"'socially prestigious. In a small ~tate, belonging to particular tribe. or other defmed social gmu~. is much 
mot-e important thnn memhcrship of the. ~ivil ~crvice. Often tribal relation> nre projected 01110 the relational 
net\'t'OI''- in thtt civil service. Thi"' can make public action socially supponed. but can atsu affect llu .. · 
ctlicienc) and clfcctiveness of the ci\il service. 
Relationship between Civil Servants and Politicians 
Smallness inOucnces not only the relationship between the civil service and citizens, but alsn the 
relationship between elected p(tliticians and career civil servants. Politicians are usually those whn h> 
dtfinition 'hould represents wcll-dctined interests and, through an efficient bargaininj1. process. shout.! 
ensure that the public inte~t is >erved. 
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In u s•t.tll sl<ltc. the prevalence oflocal and group interests dominate politicallile. Pructic~ ht" 'ho-.n that 
it is very difticult to introduce Ute concept of"greater purpose" or "n~tional interest~". Smaiii<><Jal inter"''' 
duminatc the national political scene in a small country. Often the necessary le,el of co-operation can be 
achic•cd only when the country negotiates with an outsider. but even then not ai\\U)S. To wmc c'tcnt this 
practice is a remnant of the past, when these countries were ruled b) colonial po"ers. In order to maint.lin 
the orJer nece>sat') to extract resources and protect colonial interests. the colonisers fragment<!d tht l~al 
poliucal scene and creating many, often artificial. ditTcrence~, folio" ing an old Roman ma\im ·'di• tde and 
ntle". 
The C·)lonial heritage abo o;eriousl) influenced the desib'll of the politico admtni'>lr'.tti•c rd.uiunships. In 
coloniJI tim~ the colonies geoerally had no political function. Politics \\as perfonned in the m<lropOii'>, 
"bile the execution of basic laws wa.~ cntru<;ted 10 Inca! ci•il "'"'icc (bcllcr rdcm:d to ~, ·(ol<lllial 
Service'). Colonial service ruled a dependent tenitof) intere~1ed only in maintamin~: Ia" and o~rdcr anJ 
pre,·entmg any outbreak uf social unrest. With independence, the b.1>ic stntcture of <<>lomal ~ •cc was 
transformed, or often just rc-~amed into the national civi1 service, with a noflc~.ab1e chang!! on I) ;u th~ v~.-'1) 
tnp. S~nior colonial civil servants v.ere replaced by the locals. and leading <n.,,n ~tppointcd nl'ticial' "ut 
r<plau:d l>y elected politicians in the vast majority of ca~es. 
1 ho \:<llonia\ f'OWers \\SUa\\y tried \<> f,l'OU!> some 0~ \"" '\'>UO\\C ... 1\m\n\-.\T'a\\\m '6~\w\\\<:."- I<" ·~ Tl\\t'I\""T u\ 
dt:fh::rdem territories in order to r~ap tC<)nomle!o> of sca\e. A fler im.\I!Jlendencc. m·.1.n)! (,\· \h~"'c ac\\\''ln'> ''crc 
re!!nrced somewhat constrtlining. lndependem·e U'.1S usull/ly 1Jccomp.1m<xl b_o r/Sli1g JJ,1/IO/Jitlt311! ttlltl !Itt• 
nece%ity to cteate as many national institutions as \)OSsib\e. In the transition proce~~.l"e w"ole \UUC\1->te o~ 
the fo,mer colonial SCI'\ icc was kept, and changed gradually over time, not alway; for the better. llo11evcr. 
dis~embling the common in,titut ions is a very costly exercise. l'herefore, the ne.v independent stnall ~lute' 
suffered and many still do, from problems in planning, financing, stalling and opcratinl/,thcir !:l•vcrnmcnts 
due to the small scale on which administrative activities are carried out (UN ITAR. 1971: 149). 
Small 'lutes are often pushed to organise public service structures similar to tho~ of lnrgtr $tntes. l'his 
tnMiy exercise however does not guarantee success. The public sector of man} small states offers n wide 
runge of 'ervices which can be. and u.<iually are excessive given the lim ited resources. The cnU for n si;r.e 
emU or~unisationnl strucrure \~t·hich is compatible with a country's economic pott:ntial itnd sociat abiliti~~ i~ 
otl\:n i);norcd. A civil sen· ice structure, copied fi"Om larger countr;es, requirt:\ o;;iyn i ficunt cv-urdinul iun 
effort\, "hich tend to be deficient in small states. Otlen the means Qf co--ordination pr-=\liou1ly cxi,ling 
under colonial times do not remain in place, and are too expensive to be established. 
Puliti~o-admmistrati\'e relationships in small st.atc5. arc thcrcfhrc burdcn~d nul unl> '"'ith cun ... ua.ioh 
rdating to economies of scale. but also with tbe tradition deri>ed li·om tbe limncr colunial lt<;l'\ iC,, the 
(>rc,cnce of a close-l<nit social relationships, the exerctse of tnbal and local patnouc mteresb pre~nt nr the 
>tato bel. In a ca<e like !his. it can be queslioned whed1er existin!l- m~ls of politico-admini>truti\C 
rdationsht~ can operate etfectively, and whether it is necessary to create a hybrid model combinin): th..: 
Jl<lliuco-adminismuive relationships at the national and at local government le,els 
Conclusion 
In the modem theol) of Public Administration. the relationship bet,.een politician~ (or political "i'l"""t'cs) 
and professional. career civil sen· ants has recent!>· anracted particular anent ion. I he fall of the norlin Wall 
and disappearance of communist regimes in Central and Eastern European Countries has stimulated fun her 
intcrco.t in this matter. On I~ an independent and professional civil service can meet the e~pcctltions of 011 
increa<ingl) demanding citizen. which more and more often perceives hiv'hersclf .. , a tax-payin!; cu,tomct. 
and tlterefore expects a good service. 
Small :-.Lat..:-., a' a rule. inherited the basic civil service structure from their colonising powcrli.. 1\hhou,gh the 
main scope of the service changed with independence. in many ca'e' tho colonial •tructure has been 
pre~rved. Due 10 their size. small states face special problems in having" professional and i01rarltal dvil 
~erviee. a problem made worse by economies of scale constraints. '1 he small size of the scrvic~ m~:ans thut 
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everyone will ~now everyone, and unavoidably national divisions will be notic~able in the ci,il scrvkc "' 
well. The main problem is as to how to define and control the influence oflocal influences. 
Some autho~ prt>po~c the application of models of local government to """II •tdte,, However. local 
government \\OUid be interested in local issues. whereas the government of \mall 'tate> i, also invul'"d 
with national (central government) issues. hen Lccmans' classification (Lccmans. 1970) of underl)ing 
'dual'. ·fused' and ·split hierarchy' mcdels cannot be applied in the case of small jurisdictions. All thrw 
models assume some lind of relationship between the local go•emment and the central authontie>. Rut 
small States ha•e no "'o- or thn.>c-hcr government. the central go•emment is at the <arne time local 
go•·enment. and local politic< becomes nationalle•-el politiC1>. 
n..: t\i<ting models of pohtico-adtuinisaath·e relationship. genernll) devi<ed tor I~• "wt"' nith 
'ignil;cant n:«>urces. are not therefore necessaril~ applicable to small states. The redetinohon .,,. the 
relatiun>hip of <maller social groups (clans, tribes. etc.) and their members "ho are current!) on tl~ civil 
servire onu>t he considered in this regard. 
Opening the public policy process and widening soci~l punic1pation in small state) can pr<>mot~ tho: 
developonenl of a prnfcssional civil service and the establishment of career civil servants. especi~lly at 
senior level. tn urdor lo make this effective, s~ial coutractual relation; must be develo~d to reduct lht 
brain drJin. Whik hig countries usually have enough resources and can atTord 10 make mistakes, small 
states do no1 have such a luxury. 
The rnly solution for improving the :)(:rviee does not lie in the importation of foreiJ?Il modelS; but in the 
more eft1cient and cffccth·e use of existing resources, and this is the reason why clen7ng up the 
relnrionship bcl"ccn the political appointees and professional (career) civil ~CI'\'ilnts is of crucinl 
imponancc. 
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